

From Human Nature to Authentic Subjectivity in Moral Theology: Insight or Oversight?

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This paper critically evaluates the claim of the moral theologian Michael Himes that it is possible (indeed preferable) to affirm a human subject without affirming a human nature. My analysis focuses on five problematic areas in Himes's argument. First, his argument seems to replace a philosophical anthropology based on a metaphysics of substances with one that is historically based. Using a historical argument to advocate this change begs the question. Second, Himes's argument seems to misunderstand Thomistic abstraction as reductionistic in essence and unable to account for historical change. Third, Himes's argument seems to give priority to a holistic theory of meaning over a foundationalist theory of meaning. Fourth, Himes's argument seems to exclude the possibility of the Church defining any moral teaching with certainty which contradicts Church teaching (*Veritatis Splendor*). Fifth, Himes's argument seems to use a Kantian epistemology which appears internally inconsistent.

In his article, "The Human Person in Contemporary Theology: From Human Nature to Authentic Subjectivity," the moral theologian Michael J. Himes notes a shift in the way contemporary theologians understand the human person.¹ The goal of this paper is to clarify what Himes means by "authentic subjectivity" and to analyze his argument that it is possible to affirm a human subject without affirming a human nature. Thus the first part of this paper will summarize Himes's argument for this shift. The second part will raise several questions that still need to be more fully addressed before his argument can be considered conclusive.

Himes begins his explanation for this shift by noting that historical consciousness is "the hallmark of modernity" (p. 49). By historical consciousness, Himes means the awareness of the priority of time in understanding the world around us. In other words, "to gain an adequate understanding of any phenomenon or adequately assess its value, it must be considered in terms of the place which it occupies and the role which it plays within a process of development." (Himes, p. 51).

Historical consciousness recognizes that meanings are always meanings in context. Change the context and the meaning also changes. The question of whether Gentiles converted to Christianity were obliged to keep the Mosaic law

as related in *Acts 15* is an example of historical consciousness at work. The Mosaic law required that Jews be circumcised and refrain from eating pork. The apostles recognized that their former understanding of the Mosaic law as universally binding for salvation had to be reinterpreted in the new historical context of Christ's death and resurrection. This new context necessitated a distinction between a universal moral code and cultic norms such as circumcision and the dietary laws. The cultic norms played an important role in the former covenant but were not universal and therefore binding on all believers in the new covenant.

Prior to modernity, such fundamental conceptual shifts were the exception. They could be seen as a correction. Now (with this correction) we have the truth. We know the way it really is. But according to Himes, by the middle of the seventeenth century the pace of change made this belief in a single normative "classical" culture untenable.

The increased rate of scientific and technological change in the seventeenth century made it possible to observe significant differences in common sense from one generation to another or from the beginning of a lifetime to its end. . . . For if today is so very different from yesterday, why should tomorrow not be even more different from today? The end of the seventeenth century produced a crisis in consciousness not because it was an age of scientific revolution, but because the people of the time *recognized* [italics his] that theirs was an age of scientific revolution (pp. 50-51).

With historical consciousness, however, came the problem of historicism. "If every world-view, every philosophical system, every moral code is the product of a particular age with its particular advantages and problems and can make no claim to universal validity, then are we not reduced to organizing our individual lives and our societies on the basis of personal preference, advantage, or groundless tradition?" (p. 53) The challenge for contemporary theology is to resolve the problem of historicism in the context of historical consciousness.

Himes offers several conditions he considers necessary if theological work is to meet this criterion. First, theology must not be understood as a deductive science yielding certitude but rather as an empirical science yielding results that are probable. Second, the move to an empirically-based theology must be seen as irreversible because:

Historical consciousness can adequately account for the emergence and dominance of classical consciousness and for its replacement, while classical consciousness has no way to account for the emergence and dominance of historical consciousness, save perhaps in the purely negative category of a mistake (p. 54).

Third, theology done in the context of historical consciousness requires a new conceptual framework and vocabulary (pp. 54-5). "The language of Aristotle, so useful for so long within the world of classical consciousness, is inadequate to the new demands" (p. 55).

The demand here is for the affirmation of the human being in a world marked not by stability but change. But the classicist notion of human nature is opposed to this understanding precisely because it abstracts from the context where change is found:

The classicist begins by abstracting from all the differences distinguishing one man from another and so is left with a residue called human nature. Obviously, on the basis of this procedure this human nature will be always and everywhere the same. In such a procedure one will never arrive at a demand for a change of law or form or method because abstract universals do not change (p. 55).

A historically-minded theology recognizes that to be human is to be in time. The human subject is thus a historical product that vanishes if one attempts to abstract the human subject apart from an historical context. The historically-minded thinker therefore takes an empirical approach to understanding the human subject, carefully observing people as they are in order to grasp the concrete intentional acts--the thoughts and desires--informed by meaning that give significance to human living (p. 55). These individual thoughts and desires and the communal meanings that grow out of them are not timeless abstractions but the "hard-won fruit" of historical perspective acquired through understanding "how the patterns of living, the institutions, the common meaning of one place and time differ from those of another. . . . Thus not merely the possibility of change but the insistence upon it is built into the second method of apprehending human being" (p. 56).

Where traditional theology had philosophy as its primary dialogical partner, modern theology has entered into a conversation with history. We now speak of salvation history. But the danger here is that in stressing the historical character of human life we might fail to note what Edward Schillebeeckx calls the "transhistorical orientation" of human subjectivity. "Historical consciousness is consciousness not only within but *of* history." (p. 58, Himes's italics). For example, historians do not see their work as purely the product of historical forces--be they physical, social, economic, or psychological. The very effort to gather, select, organize, and explain historical data presupposes the possibility of arriving at some kind of understanding (however limited) which transcends the historian's own historical circumstances.

Thus human subjectivity is an interplay of givens with intentions which have some degree of spontaneity. This focus on the human capacity for intentionality is precisely what Himes means by "subjectivity." The turn to the

subject which characterizes modern thought "is a study of the human being in so far as he is conscious"--that is, capable of thoughts and desires (p. 59).

Our capacity to know and desire allows us to be not only a product of historical forces but also a shaper of those forces. It therefore becomes important to identify what capacities enable us to think and desire and to act on those thoughts and desires. Himes understands "authenticity" as an indicator of the degree to which one's capacity to think and desire has been actualized.

[It is only by reflecting] on the concrete historical subject that we arrive at the concrete operations which we call, when taken together, authentic human existence. Our fulfillment of these capacities is an obligation which calls us to be moral beings (p. 60).

"Authenticity" then indicates a developmental and moral dimension to our subjectivity--a capacity and an obligation to be intentional about actualizing our capacity for intentionality. We become progressively more authentic as we progressively activate our potential to know and desire and therefore love.

As noted before, Himes argues that the study of intentionality and meaning cannot proceed by the study of an abstract and universal human nature because this excessive objectification of a human subject prescind from the concrete operations of a human subject (inquiry, reflection, deliberation, and action). Thus the historically-minded thinker employs a transcendental reflection. The term "transcendental" here recalls Kant who designated as transcendental "all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori."² In other words, transcendental reflection turns our attention to *the conditions for the possibility* of inquiring, reflecting, deliberating, and acting.

Thus the human being is no longer understood by reference to faculties, qualities, or obligations, but rather by the operations of intentionality which render him a subject capable of performing those operations and so entering into the specifically human world of shared meaning. It is here that we discover the permanent dimension of human being." (p. 60, italics mine).

In summary, Himes's argument is understood to be:

1. Historical consciousness is the awareness that meaning is always meaning in context. To gain an adequate understanding of any phenomenon or adequately assess its value, it must be considered in terms of the place which it occupies and the role which it plays within a process of development. It is a superior way of understanding the world because it alone can account for the emergence of classical consciousness and its replacement by historical consciousness.

2. The traditional category of human nature does not allow for an historically-minded assessment because it is excessively abstract. It objectifies the human subject into a universal and unchanging nature shorn of context. Because it sees truth as certain and therefore immutable, it is insufficiently attentive to context.

3. Authentic subjectivity meets the challenge of historical consciousness because it does not objectify the human person into a set of fixed qualities shorn of any context but rather begins with the human subject's concrete cognitive operations. It understands the human person in terms of the place he or she occupies and the role which he or she plays within a process of development. Because this second approach is empirical, it is attentive to context.

4. The notion of authentic subjectivity finds a permanent ground for the human subject through a transcendental reflection on the a priori conditions that must be present for the human subject to carry out intentional operations.

The second part of this paper takes up each part of this argument and raises questions I believe Himes does not adequately address.

1. Modern empirical science has uncovered a world far more in flux than classical science envisioned. The increasingly rapid pace of technological development and the emergence of a global civilization over the past few centuries have brought about a new appreciation for the complex variations in human culture. But these new discoveries and appreciations do not in themselves constitute an adequate demonstration of the historical consciousness thesis. Nor does it prove that historical consciousness is a superior philosophical framework (or even an adequate starting point) for any science, let alone moral theology.

It is important to note that "change" can be taken in two different ways here--change at the level of cognition and change at the level of being. When Himes describes the "crisis of European consciousness" that began at the close of the seventeenth century, he seems to be referring to change at the level of cognition.

The end of the seventeenth century produced a crisis in consciousness not because it was an age of scientific revolution, but because the people of the time *recognized* that theirs was an age of scientific revolution (p. 50-1). In other words, the advent of historical consciousness was a change at the level of cognition brought about by a new appreciation of the dynamic complexity of reality.

But change at the level of cognition cannot be equated with change at the level of being. For example at one time popular wisdom held that heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects. Then Galileo demonstrated that objects of different weights fall at the same speed. Today we know that at a given point in a gravitational field, the rate of gravitational acceleration is independent of mass, that is, a feather and a cannon ball "dropped" from the same point fall at

exactly the same speed in a vacuum. Our awareness of physical laws has changed. But those physical laws work exactly the same now as before. There has been a change at the level of cognition about being but not at the level of being itself.

A heightened awareness of human cognition's potency for growth and revision does not in itself demonstrate the inadequacy of an Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysic of substances to give an account of this new awareness. That would be like arguing that a natural science which understands the universe in terms of physical laws is inadequate by pointing out that physicists no longer talk in terms of physical laws. In other words, to assert the primacy of history over metaphysics with an historical argument is begging the question.

For Thomas (as for Aristotle), metaphysics may be the last science in the order of discovery. But it is the first science in the order of demonstration.³ Unless Himes is completely abandoning the Thomistic tradition, he needs either to affirm the need for a metaphysic of substance underlying history or to offer a metaphysical critique of that metaphysic.

Himes might respond that this objection smuggles classical consciousness presuppositions back into the argument. But this amounts to the fallacy of rejecting a classicist metaphysic of substances because classicists are consistent in understanding the world in terms of a metaphysic of substances. I would hope that each side would be guilty at least of being consistent about its position!

As said earlier, it is necessary to distinguish between two different approaches to understanding "change." The first approach is integral in that it affirms the importance of historical understanding without rejecting the notion of a stable intelligibility underlying these patterns of cognitional change. In short, it *subordinates* historical understanding to being. The second approach is oppositional in that it posits historical consciousness at the a priori level and thus seeks to replace metaphysics with a historically-focused philosophy.⁴ It subordinates being to historical understanding. Is Himes's argument based on the first or the second understanding of historical consciousness? In other words, does he affirm the need for a metaphysics underlying his philosophical anthropology or does he intend to work from a historically-based philosophical anthropology?

Now it is an historical fact that modernity abandoned a metaphysic of substances in favor of one that has nominalist, empiricist, and idealist elements.⁵ Undoubtedly Himes recognizes this and wishes to enter into dialogue with modernity as it is. Still it does not necessarily follow that the strategy of shifting one's conceptual framework and vocabulary is sound or the only available course for theologians who want to enter into a fruitful dialogue with modernity. One could also seek to clarify the problems one encounters in replacing metaphysics with a historically-based philosophy--historicism being the most outstanding example.

2. Himes rejects the classicist category of "human nature" as being insufficiently attentive to context and change "because abstract universals do not change" (p. 55). It may be true that abstract universals do not change. But it does not necessarily follow that we cannot adequately grasp change through abstract universals.

It can be misleading to characterize abstraction without qualification as reductionistic. It is necessary to distinguish between two different ways in which the word "abstraction" is used in a classicist framework. First, there is the abstraction arrived at by way of composition and division. Second, there is the abstraction arrived at by way of simple and absolute consideration.⁶ Now the abstraction arrived at by way of composition and division does involve a reduction in that the intellect sets aside *in a purely formal way* some intelligible aspects of the object under consideration in order to focus on the various properties, accidents, and various relations of the essence. But this kind of abstraction is dependent on a prior abstraction by way of simple and absolute consideration which is not a reductive act. Rather it is a process of identification where the knower *becomes the known as other*--that is, in a real but non-material way (by a separation of the intelligible species from the phantasm). Thus, the first kind of abstraction involved in cognition is not a stripping away of intelligible content. Even abstraction by way of composition and division simply attends to what it considers without explicitly excluding from the concept the other aspects which the concrete object of attention really possesses.⁷ Thus reduction is not the essence of abstractive understanding as Himes seems to imply. Nor does abstraction understood in its fullness exclude in a definitive way the understanding of the concrete particulars where change is found. Rather, it makes possible the analytical process necessary to grasp the object in a more distinct and richer way.

Indeed Himes's presentation of abstraction seems more Lockean than Aristotelian or Thomistic. In Book II of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, John Locke defines abstraction:

The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas, are chiefly these three... The third [act of the mind] is separating them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence: this is called abstraction: and thus all its ideas are made.⁸

In contrast, Aristotle describes the process whereby the mind grasps the universal not as a reductive procedure but as a non-enumerative *inductive* procedure.

So out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience, for a number of memories constitute a single experience. From experience, again, i.e., from the universal now stabilized in its entirety within the soul, the one

beside the many which is a single identity within them all, originate the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science, skill in the sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of being.⁹

Clearly knowledge of a universal is arrived at not by stripping away from the particular. Rather, when the senses perceive a particular object, the intellect's potency to grasp the form (the intelligible content) common to various particular objects that share that form is actualized. It is through the *accumulative experience* of many particular objects that share a common form that the intellect grows in its ability to grasp more fully and accurately this common intelligible form. Aristotle specifically uses the phrase "the one *beside* the many," not "the one *reduced from* the many."¹⁰

Etienne Gilson, perhaps the most tenacious defender of Thomistic realism in this century, makes the point quite well:

Far from being reduced to a pure logical form, in Aristotelianism the concept is always conceived in and by the means of the concrete. In fact, what is criticized under the heading of scholastic abstraction is actually a caricature of true realist abstraction, for it neither contains the empirical content which Aristotle attributed to it nor does it retain its simple nature, as maintained by Descartes. Cartesio-Thomism's mistake is to believe that a monster which could only be of interest to philosophical teratology is viable. Once you start with a realist notion of abstraction, it is futile to seek to reunite abstraction with an object which it presupposes.¹¹

Thus, I would submit that the Thomistic metaphysic can indeed handle the problem of historical change that Himes describes. Indeed, change becomes intelligible only through some principle of stability. Aristotle developed his metaphysic of substance and accident to give a precise philosophical account of a world that is both intelligible and changing. So why does intelligible stability at the level of being (a metaphysic of substance) now entail an incapability for change at the level of cognition? The Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysic always recognized that there is a potency of cognition for continual revision and growth. As human knowers, we never gain a comprehensive or exhaustive understanding of human nature because we do not have direct knowledge of natures. We apprehend only accidentals and must reason back to the underlying nature. Thus, at the level of being, human nature does not change. But at the level of cognition there is always a potency for change, i.e., a better understanding of human nature.¹²

3. Himes contrasts "human nature" and "authentic subjectivity" as two different ways of understanding the human being:

... one "abstractly through a definition that applies *omni et soli* and through properties verifiable in every man," the other "as a concrete aggregate developing over time, where the locus of development, and so to speak, the synthetic bond is the emergence, expansion, differentiation, dialectic of meaning and of meaningful performance" (p. 56).

This presentation of authentic subjectivity as an alternative way of understanding distinct from abstraction raises two important questions, one epistemological and the other moral. First, if Himes is basing his understanding of the human person on concrete cognitive operations, does he consider the order of cognition to be included within the order or being (understood analogically)? If not, then how can he know the human subject? Second, does this second way of understanding provide an affirmation of the human person strong enough to definitively exclude certain fundamental attacks on the dignity of human person which find increasing acceptance in modern society?

Regarding the first question, without a stable human nature, how does Himes avoid falling into radical empiricism (the view that there are no universals but only particulars)? If Himes no longer maintains the existence of universals, then how does he avoid the nominalism of Ockham? Furthermore, if nothing outside of our cognitional structure is stable, then how is knowledge possible? What indeed does the mental word "human being" refer to? Without stable natures, we are seemingly faced with the ancient Heraclitean problem of never being able to return to the same droplet of thought in an endlessly rushing river of intentional acts.

In other words, a meaning-in-context still presupposes some basic framework of intelligibility (substances that can be apprehended by the mind's asking, "What is it?") if it is to be a meaning at all.

It is quite true that the precise meaning of many words, and even of propositions, cannot, without possibility of misinterpretation, be determined outside their proper contexts. If that were not the case, no one could say they were "quoted out of context." If, however, the meaning of any external word [written or oral word] is an intramental concept, the threat of either an infinite regress or a vicious circle as regards meaning is difficult to ignore. That is to say, it is not at all evident that a holistic theory of meaning can completely replace a foundationalist theory of meaning.¹³

It might be helpful here to compare this issue to a toy house a child builds out of Legos. The toy house (context) is a structure of Lego blocks (meanings) placed into a certain arrangement (meanings-in-context). To understand the meaning of each Lego block in this toy house, one must understand the Lego block in its context. But the toy house presupposes the Lego blocks, not vice versa. This is true *even from a historical perspective*. The toy house is not prior to the Lego blocks used to create it. Rather the Lego blocks used to create the

toy house are prior both logically and historically. Lego blocks have an intelligibility--a nature if you will--prior to the toy house. And it is precisely the grasping of this intelligibility that makes possible the creation of meanings-in-context, in this case, building the toy house. In the same way, I would argue, meanings-in-context presuppose a more basic framework of foundational meanings/concepts/intelligible natures. (It is interesting to note that children acquire a basic framework for language and culture in the same way, block by block.)

As to the second question, Himes's preferred way of understanding the human being focuses on fixed cognitive operations yielding understandings that are always historically conditioned. But the consequence is that theology must relinquish the status to being a deductive science capable of drawing conclusions from revelation that can in any way be certain (p. 54). This is why Himes characterizes the historically-minded approach to the study of the human person as necessarily "multidimensional and interdisciplinary" (p. 56).

Questions regarding genetic manipulation consequently impel the theologian into conversation with the fields of medicine, sociology, and public policy, a conversation in which the theologian does not "lay down the law" in advance, but makes the contributions of these other disciplines an "inner-theological" element in his own reflection (p. 57).

Does this understanding of moral theology as an empirical science leave any room for a normative dimension to Catholic moral teaching? If the price of joining the modern conversation is that the historically-minded moral theologian can draw conclusions that are at best only provisional, how can this theologian ever arrive at a determination that any action (for example abortion, human cloning, ethnic cleansing, or female castration) is always and everywhere contrary to the dignity of the human person? How can this permanent lack of certitude be reconciled with *de fide* Catholic teaching that "reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature 'incapable of being ordered' to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in His image"¹⁴? Does Himes's position entail that the pope lacks any special competence in the area of natural law? Opponents to the Church's teachings on abortion, euthanasia, birth control, and homosexual activity would welcome such a conclusion.

4. Having rejected (or at least not affirmed) a theory of abstraction and a metaphysic of substances, Himes turns to transcendental reflection to ground contemporary moral theology against collapse into historicism. Transcendental reflection focuses on the a priori conditions that must be present for the human subject to carry out concrete intentional operations. Himes asserts that a transcendental reflection is sufficient to discover the permanent dimension of the human being (p. 60). No doubt space precluded further explanation. But he must surely know that this point is in dispute among contemporary Thomists

precisely because the method makes the human knower a constitutive factor in the knowledge of objects.

Just as a pencil sharpener modifies the pencils it admits, so too the human knower constitutes the object of consciousness. In such a situation, the knower is in real doubt as to whether the constitution produces a distortion or manifests things for what they are.¹⁵

One could attempt to resolve the doubt through "retortion," the performative contradiction that emerges from the observation that any doubt of the *a priori* rule of constitution must necessarily employ the rule in its very exercise. But as John F.X. Knasas points out:

. . . The skeptic is on good grounds to insist that this phenomenon is just one would expect if the rule is merely *a priori* and not objective at all. The skeptic's employment of a notion of the objective arises naturally from previous acquaintance with limited rules of constitution. Why may not the "universal" constitutive rule be actually limited too? In sum, retortion is indecisive for purpose of deciding between distortion or objectivity.¹⁶

This raises the deeper question of whether a transcendental method--or any critical method--is able to establish an objective reality for those who begin in the footsteps of Descartes and Kant by subordinating the order of being to the order of cognition.

We all experience sensations of other human beings and have the strong sense that we know their existence. For Thomas this knowledge comes to us via simple apprehension and is formally grasped in the second act of the mind where we affirm the existence of another whose existence is not necessary but contingent. Thus knowledge is itself the evidence of the existence of the object known. And for Thomas the object known, not the knower, is the sole content-determining cause of knowledge.¹⁷

Presumably then one starts with a transcendental reflection on the knowing subject because one deems there is something inadequate in this "naive" realism. But to say that we do not take the immediately self-evident existence of other beings as our starting point has radical and unavoidable consequences. As Gilson points out, "to proceed from thought to being in any sense whatsoever is to follow an idealist methodology" with the result that one is condemned to fall either into idealism or self-contradiction.¹⁸

This becomes more clear if one faces the full implications of the Kantian critique of knowledge. For those who start with the subject, this means recognizing that one must carry the distinction between phenomena and noumena even to the ego itself. Thus one must make the distinction between the empirical ego which is part of the world of phenomena and the transcendental ego which alone exists in the world of noumena. Now an adequate response to

the Kantian critique must locate the permanent dimension of the human being not in the empirical ego but in the transcendental ego. But any reflection gives us access not to the transcendental ego but only to the empirical ego.

Here we arrive back at the initial problem. Without a realist metaphysics on which to build an adequate realist epistemology, how can Himes discover the permanent dimension of the human being? If he starts with an a priori historical consciousness, he necessarily forfeits the right to start with the knowable subsisting object. And if he turns to the subject, how can he get from the empirical ego to the transcendental ego which alone can provide the permanent ground he seeks?

Kant's critique is valid for a rationalistic metaphysic which starts with the knowing subject but not for an existentialist metaphysic which starts with the known object. Thus the exchange of deductive certainty for empirical probability which seems so promising for dialogue with modernity is in fact a fatal price to pay for moral theology. Wouldn't contemporary theology be making a more lasting contribution to modernity by insisting that there is necessary as well as contingent knowledge, and how can that be done without retaining a metaphysic of substances? Without answers to these questions, it would seem an oversight, not an insight, to affirm a human subject without affirming a human nature.

Notes

1. Michael J. Himes, "The Human Person in Contemporary Theology: From Human Nature to Authentic Subjectivity," from *Introduction to Christian Ethics: A Reader*, ed. Ronald Hamel and Kenneth Himes (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist, 1989) pp. 49-62.

2. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 59. Quoted in Himes, p. 59.

3. See Aquinas' Exposition on Boethius' De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1, ad. 9. in *Division and Methods of the Sciences*. Trans. Armand Maurer. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986).

4. See Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, *The Nature and Mission of Theology*, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), pp. 20-1.

5. See Etienne Gilson's *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937) and *Being and Some Philosophers*, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949).¹⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1981), I. 85. 1.

6. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1981), I. 85.1.

7. Bernard Wuellner, *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*, (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1956), p. 96.

8. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, (Oxford: 1894) 2,12,1:1, p. 214.

9. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Book II, Ch. 19, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, edited by Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941) p. 185.

10. Thus, equating insight with the mental word or concept does not preclude a process of development in understanding at the level of the individual or of the community. It certainly cannot be equated with a Platonic remembering.

11. Etienne Gilson, *Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge*, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), pp. 192-3.

12. See Aquinas, I. 85. 5.

13. Peter Pagan, "Lonergan and Aquinas on Indemonstrable First Principles." Unpublished paper.

14. John Paul II, *Veritatis Splendor* (1993), #80.

15. John F. X. Knasas, "Transcendental Thomism and De Veritate I, 9," *Thomistic Papers 6*, ed. by John F.X. Knasas, (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), pp. 232-33.

16. Knasas, pp. 233-4.

17. Here I am speaking not of constructural knowledge (for example mathematics or logic) but of spontaneous and philosophical knowledge. See Leo Sweeney, *A Metaphysics of Authentic Existentialism*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965) p. 137, n. 10.

18. Gilson, p. 61.

