

**Relying on the Wisdom of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*
in Developing a Model for Pastoral Psychology**

by

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Introduction

The name "pastoral psychology" suggests the mixing of two distinct fields of thought, yet many have attempted to integrate the two. Several universities in the United States offer degrees in pastoral counseling or pastoral psychology, including courses in the integration of pastoral theology and psychology. Other institutional approaches to integration of these fields include research by the National Institute for Health Research on topics of "spirituality and healing"¹ and the organizational efforts of the American Association of Pastoral Counselors (AAPC). Individuals have attempted to discuss psychological principles from a pastoral perspective and have published in journals such as the *Journal of Pastoral Care*, *American Journal of Pastoral Counseling*, or *Pastoral Psychology*. However, among treatment providers and receivers "pastoral psychology" has yet to evoke a common definition of what is entailed.

This article has the goal of advancing a conversation on the subject of pastoral psychology. First, it will examine the value of such a discussion. Then it will offer an approach to pastoral psychology rooted in the Roman Catholic tradition and supported by the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* and the work of Thomas Aquinas on the subject of the passions. Finally, it will offer a case example to contrast a counseling approach that is not specifically pastoral with one that is rooted in Catholic teaching.

The Value of the Discussion

Recognizing the Division that Exists

Many have surveyed the history of psychology, noting the influences of philosophy, theology, and—more recently—science.²

Three factors which seem to have contributed greatly to the division experienced between the fields of pastoral theology and psychology are ethical principles, the distinction between philosophical and scientific psychology, and confusion regarding dualism in human nature. All three touch upon the question of the nature of man.

The discussion of ethical principles in relation to psychology began with Aristotle, who, according to Thomas H. Leahey, “erected his ethics squarely on his psychology.”³ Aristotle, for example, wrote of emotion as something “essential to the good life”; he described it as having a cognitive component, taking place in a social and ethical context, and involving

a behavioral tendency and physical arousal.⁴ Nearly all emotions get expressed in behaviors. In addition, one can presuppose that there are cognitions underlying the emotions that insinuate an intentionality to emotions. Many philosophers, including Thomas Aquinas, Rene Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Frederich Nietzsche,⁵ continued to discuss emotions and other topics of psychology within an ethical context. However, in the wake of the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century, it was common for many scientists to ignore the ethical aspect of emotions. Briefly stated: with the advent of mechanistic theories, which described the body as a machine, there was no longer a need to include ethics in the discussion of the human person. One could speak of a person's thoughts and feelings without placing on them the values of "good" or "evil."

The distinction between philosophical and scientific psychology began with the scientific revolution and was greatly influenced by modern studies in physiology. Wilhelm Wundt wrote *Principles of Physiological Psychology* in 1874 which was soon followed by *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* by Franz Brentano.⁶ While the subject of philosophical psychology had been the experiences and behaviors of the human person in light of philosophical principles about the nature of man, the subject of scientific psychology was the experiences and behaviors of the human person in light of research conducted according to a

scientific method. Applied psychology developed as a specific field of scientific psychology. Over time the separation of psychology from its philosophical roots has widened.

This separation is in part due to the third factor contributing to the division experienced between the fields of pastoral theology and psychology, i.e., confusion regarding "dualism" in human nature. An example of current thinking on dualism is found in Leahey:

Dualism is a belief almost universally held around the world. In addition to the natural material world, religions typically posit a supernatural world populated by nonmaterial beings such as a god or gods, angels, and demons. Human beings, and sometimes animals, are regarded as composed of two substances, a nonmaterial supernatural soul contained within and controlling a material body. Dualists explain experience and behavior as the result of interaction between the body and its ruling soul.⁷

Many schools of psychology endorse a monist interpretation of the human person, i.e., not seeing the mind and the brain or the body and the soul as separate entities. They often choose to ignore the "supernatural" world as either nonexistent or irrelevant to science, which has as its subject only the material world.

From the Christian perspective, there need not be any conflict with the idea that psychological science has as its subject the material world. At the same time, there is a need to point out a criticism of dualism that can be found in Aristotle and which was further developed by Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle speaks of the soul's relationship to the body as "the form impressing itself on the body from within," *anima forma corporis*. Aquinas wrote of hylomorphism, i.e., that the body (matter) and the soul (form) are a simple, complete, and integrated substance which acts as a unity.⁸

Movements Toward Integration

While much could be said of a mutual suspicion between the scientific world and the Catholic Church since the burgeoning of scientific psychology in the last century, evidence of a desire within the Catholic Church to bridge the widening gap between the worlds of philosophical psychology and scientific psychology dates back to the nineteenth century. In the encyclical *Aeterni Patris* written in 1879, Pope Leo XIII asked for a revival of the study of Thomistic philosophy to respond to the confusion of that age. Desire Mercier, who later became Cardinal Archbishop of Malines, Belgium, took the Pope's words to heart and tried to integrate the emerging scientific psychology with the philosophy of Aquinas. He viewed philosophical psychology as belonging to that part of philosophy that deals with the human soul and

believed that both philosophical and scientific psychology had much to offer in understanding the human person.⁹

Turning to more recent Church documents, we see that in the encyclical *Fides et Ratio* (1998) Pope John Paul II portrayed faith and reason as analogous to two wings on a bird that allow it to fly. Human wisdom relies on both. The Holy Father challenged scholars and pastors in the Church to look to philosophy and the human sciences when attempting to explain reality and to use knowledge in the service of others. He had spoken of this earlier in *Pastores Dabo Vobis* (1992):

For a deeper understanding of man and the phenomena and lines of development of society, in relation to a pastoral ministry which is as "incarnate" as possible, the so-called "human sciences" can be of considerable use, sciences such as sociology, psychology, education, economics and politics, and the science of social communication. Also in the precise field of the positive or descriptive sciences, these can help the future priest prolong the living "contemporaneousness" of Christ. As Paul VI once said, "Christ became the contemporary of some men and spoke their language. Our faithfulness to him demands that this contemporaneousness should be

maintained. (no. 52)

He called scholars to trust in the unity of truth to be found when faith and reason are respectfully explored. In his address on September 9, 2000 to university professors, the Holy Father challenged them: "What is needed is a humanism in which the perspectives of science and faith no longer seem to be in conflict." (no. 4)¹⁰

To examine this issue from the perspective of psychology, I take as a starting point the Preamble and General Principles of the ethical guidelines of the American Psychological Association (APA).¹¹ Applied psychology is an area which opens a door for discussion of integrating principles from the fields of psychology and pastoral theology. The Preamble reminds us that the goals of the psychologist include both broadening the knowledge of human behavior and helping people to develop informed judgments and choices regarding their behavior. The General Principles state that a psychologist needs to be a competent person of integrity who accepts the challenges of social responsibility. He may only work with diverse populations if he is competent with those populations, and he may not discriminate against them.

In light of these guidelines, the question has been raised as to whether most psychologists take seriously the question of

Relying on the Wisdom of the Catechism 8 competency when it comes to helping those whose religious beliefs influence their behavior. In an article about informed consent in the case of religious values, Hawkins and Bullock cite the APA ethics code of 1992 that delineates members of religious groups as being in a diverse population and challenge professionals to consider how this is handled when obtaining informed consent from clients.¹² They point out the frequent discrepancy between the religious beliefs of psychologists and those of the general population.

In reflecting on this principle, I realize that before I can take on a client in therapy as a pastoral psychologist, I have an ethical obligation to let that person know my competency in the area of pastoral psychology. In my particular case I could tell him or her about my religious affiliation and my training in programs of pastoral counseling. However, the ethics code also requires that I be able to articulate the pastoral psychology theory I espouse.

Having looked at this question from the perspectives of psychology and theology, I conclude that both the teachings of the Church and the ethical guidelines of psychologists require discussion. A serious dialogue can improve the quality of care pastoral psychologists offer. In the case of the APA, psychologists need to speak truthfully of how they intend to help others and to respect the beliefs and values of others. In the

case of *Fides et Ratio* there is the call to explore both the fullness of faith and the fullness of reason in a respectful dialogue. Our faith can have a positive impact on every field of knowledge. In turn, various fields of science and knowledge have much to teach people of faith.

Articulating a Specific Anthropology

Research indicates that most people turn first to clergy when seeking psychological help.¹³ They recognize clergy as people who can help them with problems, but they do not always distinguish the competency of clergy from that of psychologists.

Some people approach clergy because they do not "trust" psychologists, assuming they will not respect the religious beliefs of the individual. On the other hand, some people seek help from psychologists without considering the impact it could have on their spiritual life. Pastoral psychology needs to highlight both commonalities and differences, i.e., to employ psychological methods which are in harmony with specific human and theological anthropologies.

In his book, *Anthropology of the Christian Vocation, Volume I: Interdisciplinary Bases*, Luigi Rulla commented on the problems that occur when "dialectical" differences arise between an anthropology that is specifically Christian and one which is not Christian.¹⁴ According to Rulla, one "cannot borrow from other anthropologies without making an appropriately critical analysis

of their presuppositions and of the dialectical differences of horizon that may exist between their views of the human person. . . ."¹⁵ He uses as examples the psychologies of Carl Rogers, Eric Berne, and Erik Erikson and shows their theories may be misleading in the particular context of religious formation. For example, in the case of Rogerian theory, one is taught to "abolish the 'oughts', the obligations and responsibilities corresponding to clearly-held values."¹⁶

Looking once more to the Preamble and General Principles of the ethical guidelines of the APA, one does not find a clearly articulated human anthropology. The guidelines do point out that human beings all have fundamental rights, dignity and worth. The rights to privacy, confidentiality, self-determination, and autonomy imply an understanding of a human anthropology, but this understanding is incomplete. It would be essential to look beyond these APA guidelines to the specific theories espoused by various schools of psychology to understand their views of the human person if one wants to discuss the relationship of such theories to pastoral psychology. Since it is not my intention in this article to articulate various anthropologies, but instead to highlight the Catholic Church's understanding of the human person, I will turn now to the second part of my article.

The Wisdom of the Church

In *Domine Iesu*, a recent Declaration by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the need to proclaim the fullness of truth is stated unequivocally.¹⁷ To attempt to do "pastoral psychology" from a Roman Catholic perspective without exploring the theological underpinnings of the tradition that touch on this ministry would be irresponsible and potentially unethical.

The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* has put together in simple language a good summary of Catholic teaching and offers a beautiful definition of the dignity of the human person:

The dignity of the human person is rooted in his creation in the image and likeness of God (*article 1*); it is fulfilled in his vocation to divine beatitude (*article 2*). It is essential to a human being freely to direct himself to this fulfillment (*article 3*). By his deliberate actions (*article 4*), the human person does, or does not conform to the good promised by God and attested by moral conscience (*article 5*).

Human beings make their own contribution to their interior growth; they make their whole sentient and spiritual lives into means of this growth (*article 6*). With the help of grace they grow in virtue (*article 7*), avoid sin, and

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if they sin they entrust themselves as did the
prodigal son to the mercy of our Father in heaven
(*article 8*). In this way they attain to the
perfection of charity. (1700)¹⁸

Each person is made in the image of God and is destined for eternal beatitude. He is gifted with free will and reason. He is given freedom, called in the Catechism "an outstanding manifestation of the divine image."¹⁹ While it is also true that people are all subject to original sin, through Christ all are invited to become adopted children of God.

In Article One the Catechism defines the Beatitudes as the fulfilment of God's promise to his people. "They express the vocation of the faithful with the glory of his (Christ's) Passion and Resurrection; they shed light on the actions and attitudes characteristic of Christian life. . . ." (1717) "The Beatitudes respond to the natural desire for happiness." (1718) "The Beatitudes reveal the goal of human existence, the ultimate ends of human acts: God calls us to his own beatitude." (1719) To be authentically human, one partakes in the divine nature. This call to Beatitude is a free gift from God that "confronts us with decisive moral choices." (1723)

Paging through this section of the Catechism can be a humbling experience for the pastoral psychologist. Articles Two through Eight continue to discuss the dignity of the human person

in terms of his freedom, the morality of human acts, the morality of the passions, moral conscience, the virtues, and sin. Studying any of these articles could lead to a deeper understanding of the human person. This in turn could help one to develop a pastoral psychology that is truly Catholic. For the sake of brevity, in this article I will highlight only Article Five, which discusses the morality of the passions.

The Catechism defines the passions as "emotions or movements of the sensitive appetite that incline us to act or not to act in regard to something felt or imagined to be good or evil." (1763) They are like a bridge between what a person senses, and how he thinks and acts upon it. (1764) In addition to the fundamental passion of love, many others are identified: desire, hope, pleasure, joy, hatred, aversion, fear, sadness, and anger. (1765) The good or evil of an emotion is not to be found in the emotion itself but in how the reason and will of the person act in relation to the emotion. "It belongs to the perfection of the moral or human good that the passions be governed by reason." (1767) The Catechism says that the "Holy Spirit accomplishes his work by mobilizing the whole being, with all its sorrows, fears, and sadness, as is visible in the Lord's agony and passion." (1769) Moral perfection requires that a man be "moved to the good not by his will alone, but also by his sensitive appetite. . . ." (1770)

These words from the Catechism are taken largely from the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Following the thinking of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas writes of the passions as integral to human action and as having cognitive, social, behavioral, physiological, and ethical components. The fact that there is an ethical component in the evaluation of a passion and human action distinguishes Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas from many of the modern psychologists. While these also speak of cognitive, social, behavioral, and physiological elements, the approach they take to the ethical evaluation is quite different. Some speak of emotions as motivating, organizing and regulating.²⁰ Some talk of emotions as important for personality development.²¹ One can also find reference to emotions as important for social interaction.²² Finally, some talk about emotions as adaptive or maladaptive²³. However, it would be uncommon to read in modern psychology a reference to emotions as having an ethical meaning or evaluation, i.e., as directed toward a specific moral end. This seems to be due to an understanding of ethics as equal to obligations versus a broader understanding of ethics as including such elements as human nature, beatific vision, revelation, grace, and virtue.²⁴

The *Summa Theologica* raised the question of whether emotions, i.e., the passions, increase or decrease the "goodness or malice of an act."²⁵ Passions, in themselves, are neither

good nor bad; however, they can affect whether an act is good or evil in two ways. It speaks of passions affecting actions "antecedently" when "they obscure the judgment of reason . . . (and) diminish the goodness of an act."²⁶ Consequently, they can also affect actions in two ways: first "by way of redundance" and second, "by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a passion, in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite."²⁷ In this case "a passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action."²⁸ Aquinas goes on to say that a "passion that tends to evil and precedes the judgment of reason diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the ways mentioned above, it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous."²⁹ According to Aquinas, if human passions are "controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue."³⁰ In contrast to contemporary psychological theory, which views passions only as motivating, organizing, regulating elements, influenced by physiology, social learning, and evolution, Aquinas viewed the passions as an important component of human nature which may contribute to moral perfection.

I would like to highlight two passions written about by Thomas Aquinas, not because these are necessarily the most important, but because they apply to the case example that I will be giving in this article. Those two passions are the very

common emotions anger and hatred. Hatred is one of the concupiscible passions, i.e., its object is some sensible good or evil.³¹ In the case of hatred, one must first experience love—that is one must have an inclination toward a good that is possessed. Hatred occurs because a person has loved someone or something and does not want anything else but that which he has loved and lost.³² According to Aquinas, a “man sometimes hates a particular truth when he wishes that what is true were not true.”³³ Hatred is often directed toward an individual because a person cannot possess that individual, who does not act in the way that the person would like. When a person hates another, he or she often wishes evil on the person hated.³⁴

Anger is different from hatred. Anger is one of the irascible passions, i.e., its object is a sensible good or evil which is difficult to obtain.³⁵ Anger occurs when someone has been unjustly hurt by another person.³⁶ It could be because that person was unkind to them, causing deliberate or indeliberate injury. When people are hurt, they reason that they have been wronged, and they would like to have justice. It is important to remember that the object of anger is always a good, and “anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore, it causes pleasure.”³⁷ However, in seeking justice, there are two approaches: a person could seek justice itself or a person could seek to inflict vengeance on another person—that is to hurt the other person.³⁸

And while anger often results from a hurt after which someone reasons that they have been hurt and desires justice, anger can also be an obstacle to reason.³⁹

This brief review of the human person in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* and the writing of Aquinas on the passions provides a basis upon which to discuss the following case example. From a Catholic perspective, the passions, while neither good nor evil in themselves, have value in that, when guided by reason, they may lead people to seek what is truly good. Moral virtues are "the fruit and seed of morally good acts; they dispose all the powers of the human being for communion with divine love."⁴⁰ Morally good acts include movement by the passions. Appropriate treatment, from a Catholic understanding, requires that the discussion of "feelings" be undertaken in light of a Catholic understanding of the human person.

A Case Example

The following hypothetical case example has been drawn from a collection of experiences in pastoral counseling: A female university student came to my office, wanting to talk about problems with her boyfriend. She told me that they had been going steady for about two years but that in the past several months, he had been less attentive and had indicated some desire

to end the relationship. She felt reluctant to do this and was trying very hard to keep the relationship going. The incident that led her to seek counseling was one in which she had decided to give a gift to her boyfriend--an expensive sweater. She said that she had hoped that the gift would provide an opportunity for them to talk about their friendship and renew their love for each other. Upon receiving the gift, the young man decided that he needed to tell her that he really was no longer interested in seeing her. The gift made him realize that she had been investing quite a bit in a relationship in which he was no longer interested. He told her this, gave her back the sweater, and she was devastated.

This counseling scenario was the first of twelve sessions and at the end of those sessions, the university student had still not resolved this issue in her life--she was still in love with this boyfriend, even though after the incident with the sweater, they had not spoken with each other. She would occasionally send him a card, even though he did not respond. Once in a while she would leave a message on his answering machine, but he never replied. Finally, at the end of twelve sessions, she asked me whether I felt it was worth her time to continue in counseling.

A Behavioral Therapy Approach

I will first review this case according to the behavioral

theory that I follow, one model of contemporary psychotherapy which is not specifically pastoral in orientation. In the case of this young woman, the feeling of anger was preceded by a refusal of her boyfriend to receive the gift. A consequence of her anger, or the behavior that followed the anger, would be her choice to talk to a third party about her feeling of anger. She felt better, but her anger returned when she attempted once more to initiate contact with her boyfriend, who continued to refuse her advances. This pattern of having some type of trigger to experiencing anger, such as her boyfriend's continuing to ignore her, her feeling angry and then speaking about it with her counselor to get rid of the angry feeling, was fairly consistent.

I would explore whether there were other situations in which she had acted in a similar way, experiencing anger when people ignored her. It is not unlikely that she would find a similar pattern in other relationships, whether current or in the past. I would then do a behavioral analysis, using the following diagram:

Refusal (S₁) - Anger (R₁/S₂)

Anger (S₂) - Talking to a Third Party (R₂/S₃)

Talking to a Third Party (S₃) - Anger Decreases (R₃)

This is a pattern that repeats itself, since she will try to initiate contact with the young man again once her anger subsides. I could speak with her about the different steps in

this pattern and suggest three possible remedies. First, she could respond differently to his refusal, accepting his stated desire for distance and not attempt to contact him. Besides not having to cope with the frustrating emotion of anger, it is possible, however unlikely, that her mature response to his desire to break off the relationship might cause him to rethink his position. Second, she could find an alternate response to the stimulus of anger, such as analyzing various cognitive distortions she has and reflecting on her situation in a more "realistic" manner. Third, she could choose to give her attention to someone else and seek another relationship, not placing herself in a context in which she would experience the stimulus of being ignored. After discussing alternate responses, I would suggest that she try employing one which she believes would be more adaptive for her situation. I would try to help her to see the consequences of her actions and reflect on whether or not she was willing to seek consequences that were more acceptable for herself. In my experience, it is very likely that she could, over time, learn behaviors that would be more adaptive and would help her to get past this pattern of anger at a person who did not return her love.

A Pastoral Psychology Approach

If I were to approach this case from the perspective of a pastoral psychologist, relying on the wisdom of the Catholic

Church, I would notice that she was experiencing emotional frustration, which occurs when a good is not attained or an evil is not avoided in accord with right reason. The good not being attained by this young college student is the love of her boyfriend. Because she cannot attain what she loves, she feels hatred, expressed in her decision to call and write this young man despite his request that she not do so. Hatred gets in the way of reason, contributing to the strong emotion of anger. In her perception, she does not deserve rejection by her boyfriend and should be able to obtain proper justice. I would diagram an analysis from this perspective as follows:

Good Sought (Love of Boyfriend) and Not Obtained - Hatred
Perception of Injustice (Refusal by Boyfriend) - Anger

The proper remedies for hatred include a greater love of the truth which is, in this case, admitting the fact that her boyfriend is free not to love her. Another remedy would be a greater love, i.e., to find someone else to whom she could devote herself. Finally, a remedy for anger would be to accept the loss of her boyfriend, which would result in less personal anguish.

Good Sought (Truth) - Love

Perception of Justice - Anger Decreases

According to the Catechism, a person has a natural desire for happiness and a love of the truth. This suggests that there lies within the person an ability to act differently in a situation. I

would encourage her to tap into this natural desire in this particular situation.

Conclusion

In contrasting these two different approaches, it is important to see how the understanding of human nature according to the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* influences the pastoral perspective. While the description of each approach was incomplete for the sake of brevity, one can see several important distinctions offered by pastoral psychology: First, the emotion of hatred is value laden and distinguished from anger. Hatred is not just a more intense anger but an emotion in response to unrequited love. Second, the pastoral psychologist offers more definite directions for the "solution" to the young woman's problem. A greater good is identified. Third, pastoral psychology recognizes the value of the feelings of anger and hatred in moving this woman to seek truth and proper justice. The call to virtue is sensed first in one's feelings. The feelings then move a person to use reason and act appropriately.

Behavioral theory offers a helpful analysis of the situation and several options for responding. It helps the psychologist to identify particular moments in which a person is feeling, reasoning, acting, so that the person can reason more effectively and decide to act in a more adaptive manner.

This focus on the passions and brief scenario demonstrate some significant differences between a psychology which is not specifically pastoral in focus and pastoral psychology. It will be important for Catholic psychologists to look to the rest of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* in order to understand more completely the nature of the human person, while remembering the other essential task of examining what the science of psychology offers and what scientific method and research contribute to understanding those who are in need of treatment.

Endnotes

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1. For example, David B. Larson, et. al., *Scientific Research on Spirituality and Health: A Consensus Report* (Rockville, MD: National Institute for Healthcare Research, 1998).
 2. See, for example, Thomas H. Leahey, *A History of Psychology: Main Currents in Psychological Thought*, 4th ed (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997); Daniel N. Robinson, *An Intellectual History of Psychology*, 3rd ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995); and Henryk Misiak and Virginia Staudt, *Catholics in Psychology: A Historical Survey* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954).
 3. Leahey, 66.
 4. Robert C. Solomon, "The Philosophy of Emotions," In *Handbook of Emotions*, 2nd ed., ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), 5.
 5. Ibid., 6-9.
 6. Misiak and Staudt, 2.
 7. Leahey, 22-23.
 8. Misiak and Staudt, 10.
 9. A pioneer among Catholics in the field of psychology, he helped develop a curriculum in scientific psychology at the University of Louvain. Henryk Misiak and Virginia Staudt detail the history of Mercier's scholarship and that of various Catholic scholars up to the mid-1950's in their book, *Catholics in Psychology: A Historical Survey*.
 10. John Paul II, "To University Teachers for Their Jubilee: Incarnation

Touches Depths of Humanity," *L'Osservatore Romano*, September 13, 2000, 2.

11. American Psychological Association, "Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct," *American Psychologist*, December 1992, 1597-1611.

12. Ioma L. Hawkins and Sylvia Bullock, "Informed Consent and Religious Values," *Psychotherapy*, 32 (2), 293-300.

13. Joseph W. Ciarrocchi, *A Minister's Handbook of Mental Disorders* (New York: Paulist Press, 1993), 3.

14. Luigi M. Rulla, *Anthropology of the Christian Vocation*, Volume I: "Interdisciplinary Bases" (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1986), 18-19.

15. *Ibid.*, 20.

16. *Ibid.*, 22.

17. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "'Dominus Iesu': On the Unicity and Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church," *Origins*, September 14, 2000, 209-224.

18. United States Catholic Conference, Inc., -Libreria Editrice Vaticana, *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Co., 1994). All further references to the *Catechism* are from this edition.

19. *Gaudium et Spes*, no. 17.

20. Carroll E. Izard and Brian P. Ackerman, "Motivational, Organizational, and Regulatory Functions of Discrete Emotions," In *Handbook of Emotions*, 2nd ed., ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), 253-264.

21. *Ibid.*, 262.

22. George W. Brown, "Emotion and Clinical Depression: An Environmental View," In *Handbook of Emotions*, 2nd ed., ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), 75-90.

23. Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, "Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions," In *Handbook of Emotions*, 2nd ed., ed. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford Press, 2000), 91-115.

24. Servais Pinkaers, *The Sources of Christian Ethics* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 1-7.

25. St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica*, I-II, 24, 3. (Translation: Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Allen, TX: Christian Classics).

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 24, 1.

31. Ibid., 25, 1.

32. Ibid., 29, 2.

33. Ibid., 29, 5.

34. Ibid., 46, 6.

35. Ibid., 25, 1.

36. Ibid., 47, 2.

37. Ibid., 46, 2.

38. Ibid., 46, 2.

39. Ibid., 48, 3.

40. United States Catholic Conference, no. 1804.