

*A Response from Thomas W. Jodziewicz
University of Dallas*

This is a very provocative essay. While it is instructive to stimulate a more thoughtful reading of the results of research and to challenge an embedded historiographical status quo that can become unexamined and habitual, and not very thoughtful—historians of course are not alone in the scholarly hesitancy toward self-reflection as to their methodological and philosophical presuppositions—it is another matter to challenge Catholic historians to assume the role of scholarly “reactionaries,” as called for by the author. Once again, for at least some bystanders, art would be in the way of imitating life: more than a few more progressive academics already consider Catholic scholars a bit beyond the circle of the conventional scholarly fire and *Catholic scholar* itself an oxymoron. One would seem to need to be prudent in gratifying these contemporary prejudices already in place against those, Catholics, who are judged to be unable to approach existential reality in an open-minded and necessarily skeptical frame of mind. And why quibble about the matter? Such campus suspiciousness of the presence of Catholicism allows for no real distinction between the authoritarian and the authoritative as the distinction advocated by Catholics sensitive to such criticism. The path of the “reactionary” here is slippery, if not downright dangerous.

The essay argues that Catholic historians (and Catholic historiography) have sold out as it were to the contemporary academic marketplace or public square. Like their non-Catholic peers, Catholic historians, whatever their actual area of interest, practice a “common-sense empirical” methodology rather than doing their history and research from within the tradition which the author approves: a) “historical inquiry as a means of reflecting on God’s providential plan for man living in time;” and b) this retrieval as part of an effort by “Catholic intellectuals” to “integrate history back into a theological framework.” A specific suggestion in the essay encourages the prospect of historical inquiry and integration to be accomplished through the prism of St. Augustine’s *City of God*. This horizon for understanding history would evidently include an assimilation of the historicity of the Gospel: the Incarnation and redemptive action of Christ, the Sermon on the Mount, the establishment of an authoritative Church, the action of the Holy Spirit in history, the priority of the theological virtues, and self-sacrifice, for example. This would be in opposition to the contemporary [post-Fall!] infatuation with personal and moral self-autonomy. The

author is clear: “History monographs are not proofs of fact; they are reflections on value.” And, further: “Catholics who engage the monographic tradition of academic history must detach the monographs from their social scientific roots and return them to a philosophical setting where they can be read for what they really are: less accounts of fact than reflections on value.” What is “reactionary” in the author’s historiographical manifesto is his call for a “shift from original research to a kind of philosophical historiography.” He would have Catholic historians divert much of their attention from writing even more monographs to reacting more directly and emphatically to modern scholarship through a more traditional lens: “We can only succeed in this task [of historical renovation or restoration] if we make our faith tradition, rather than the secular historical profession, the authoritative guide to our reading of monographs.” Or, to put it in an even more countercultural way: he is calling for a transformation of the contemporary Catholic historian “from modern academic to medieval scribe” if we are to regain “a truly Catholic approach to history.”

Well, to be a “reactionary”: Anything that would cut down on the number of monographs on, let us say, subjects of peripheral interest, would be welcome! The danger though is recognized by the author himself, even as he calls for such self-control: “Real Catholic history must embrace *all* [italics added] of life, from the rise and fall of empires to the salvation and damnation of individual souls.” In small forgotten things we can sometimes discover more than we might expect! Additional (or even renewed, or even *any*) attention to theology and philosophy in graduate programs in history in Catholic universities [and even in undergraduate curriculums] might be helpful in encouraging students (as well as we former students!) to learn the “language” available to a historiography that would recognize both Providence in history and values that are anterior to the self. Prudence and charity, however, would probably dictate the formulation (or reformulation) of an academic lingua franca accessible to the “outsider”: cf., in American history, the resuscitation of the natural law tradition. Unless the restoration of a Catholic historiography is intended to be some sort of gnosis exercise, it must be possible for the “uninitiated” to participate, or at least to communicate. In addition, the initiative’s “reactionary” entrada can make its appearance in book or monograph reviewing. Pointed and respectful commentary informed by a more traditional perspective can be employed, perhaps to some good effect. [A modest example might be found in the extended review of Jay Dolan, *In Search of an American Catholicism: A History of Religion and Culture in Tension* (Oxford, 2002) in *The Catholic Historical Review* LXXXIX

(October 2003, 807-812) which works hard with the idea of inculturation and the distinction between, and interaction of, Gospel culture and a host culture.] Also, there is surely something to be gained from historiographical essays on contemporary history, Catholic subject and non-Catholic subject, from this more traditional perspective.

In a post-modern and post-Enlightenment (academic) world, with no “privileged” metanarrative or historiographical horizon (although quite obviously certain views and values, such as self-autonomy, are in fact implicitly championed), it is surely acceptable to bring forward the “reactionary” Catholic historical perspective. It does carry heavy baggage given its rather countercultural (but charitable and humble) face “backwards” toward an authoritative order seemingly tossed aside long ago in man’s ascent to self-fulfillment. And its practitioners are at work here and there. More to the point, however, and in itself sure to carry some *éclat* in a culture ostensibly ever-open to the new and unique, is the fact that this forgotten “old way” is always radical and new and liberating in the truest sense.

*A Response from John F. Quinn
Salve Regina University*

Would It Still be History?

In “A Catholic Approach to History,” Christopher Shannon offers readers an essay with many insights along with some frustratingly vague passages. Overall, this is a bracing and provocative article which will be of interest to Catholic historians, theologians and philosophers alike.

Shannon is not at all pleased with the state of the historical profession. He asserts that the purpose of historical inquiry is to “reflect on God’s providential plan for man living in time.” Yet he doubts that most Catholic historians would describe their task in those terms. Instead, they see themselves as social scientists who are trying to revise and refine the scholarship in their rather narrow area of expertise.

Shannon does not think this is a new problem by any means. He uses American Catholic historians to highlight the difficulties that have long plagued the profession. He notes that the American Catholic Historical Association (ACHA), which was established in 1919, never made any effort to articulate a distinctively Catholic approach to history. ACHA members accepted the methods of the secular American Historical Association and simply wanted more attention and sympathy given to Catholic topics.

Shannon rightly notes the importance of John Tracy Ellis’s 1955 essay on anti-intellectualism among American Catholics. Ellis’s criticisms of Catholic scholarship led many Catholic academics to mimic their Ivy League counterparts even more closely in hopes of gaining their approbation. After Ellis, Shannon sees things going from bad to worse. The leading post-Vatican II historians have used scientific techniques “to undermine the faith.” He dismisses the work of the liberal Americanist Jay Dolan and then, to my surprise, sharply criticizes John McGreevy’s *Catholicism and American Freedom*. Describing McGreevy’s book—which was meticulously researched—as being mostly a “re-hashing” of Dolan’s work, he then takes McGreevy to task for his “silence” on abortion. In fact, McGreevy expressed sympathy for the pro-life movement and criticized Mario Cuomo and the Democratic Party for their positions. He noted that the Democrats refuse to condemn partial-birth abortions or even sex-selection abortions.¹

While McGreevy and other Catholic historians have been laboring to produce carefully footnoted, objective scholarship, Shannon

wryly points out that many secular historians—whether feminists, Marxists, or multiculturalists—have no such scruples. They have no qualms about producing what Shannon terms “hagiographies” celebrating their subjects’ efforts to emancipate women, blacks, homosexuals, etc.

While I found much to agree with in Shannon’s critique of the historical profession, I was not clear about how he would remedy the situation. He speaks of the need for a framework to guide Catholic historians and believes that St. Augustine’s *City of God* provides a model. Perhaps, but I would like to see this claim spelled out. I am not sure how Catholic historians are to go about their “search for the City of God in history.” (p.14)

I wonder if Shannon thinks that there are other scholars that can help to provide an interpretive framework for Catholic historians. What about Christopher Dawson? A prolific scholar, Dawson adhered to rigorous standards of scholarship and at the same time wrote from a professedly Catholic standpoint. In his books and essays, Dawson provided an excellent overview of world history from the time of Christ up till the twentieth century and demonstrated the centrality of religion in virtually every society. In his work on the modern era, he argued that secular religions such as Marxism and Nazism have tried to fill the void left by the decline of Christianity.²

Shannon concludes with an exhortation to Catholic scholars to read more. And they should not limit themselves to orthodox Catholic works, “but also the best of the secular monograph tradition of the last hundred years.” (p.19) This sounds good, but I would have wanted some specifics. Are there certain key works that we all must read or re-read? How do we know which works belong to this canon?

In the end, I am not sure that Shannon’s vision of Catholic history still amounts to history. His focus is very much on the manifestations of sin and grace and virtue and vice in history. Therefore, I am inclined to think that his Catholic history might be better labeled “historical theology.” Still, cautious historian that I am, I will need to amass more evidence before I can make any definite judgments on his approach. I hope he will follow up this thought-provoking and challenging essay with a sequel!

Notes

1. John McGreevy, *Catholicism and American Freedom : A History* (New York, 2003), 273-288, 294.

2. Dawson sets out some of his major themes in *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* (New York, 1957) and in *The Dynamics of World History* (New York, 1956). For a good introduction to Dawson's thought, see Edward King's entry on Dawson in *The Encyclopedia of Catholic Social Thought, Social Science and Social Policy* (2 vols.; Lanham, MD: 2007) 1: 276-280.

***A Response from Paul Radzilowski
Madonna University***

Christopher Shannon has written a fine piece that offers not only a reflection on the state of Catholic historiography today, but also a prescription for its future. I substantially agree with most of what he says, or at least take it as worthy of quite serious consideration. Among the things I am convinced he is correct about are the danger to Catholic historiography of any rigid fact/value dichotomy, his critique of the tendency of contemporary historians to read abstract or hypothetical social or personal agencies as though they were real subjects of history, and his call for a careful and selective appropriation by Catholic historians of the fruits of the monographic tradition of academic history. Surely he is also correct in saying that Catholic historiography need not exclude anything—even social history—if it is relevant at all to the more important realities of human existence, above all the salvation of souls. Perhaps most insightfully of all, he suggests that a revival of authentically Catholic historiography must begin with a distinctively Catholic way of reading histories, in the tradition of the classic fourfold meaning of Scripture, i.e. not just the “literal” meaning of events, but also the typological, broadly speaking. I would like to focus on this last observation and expand upon it for the balance of my response, along the way registering a mild dissent to what I take to be his position on a point or two.

Christopher Shannon refers, cogently enough, to the analogical nature of the Catholic vision. It is returning this vision to historiography that is a large part of his prescription for the Catholic historian today. This is an analogical vision that is—taken in its largest sense—not a collection of various comparisons, but has its metaphysical root in what the Thomists are wont to call a “prime analogate,” i.e. a primary pattern or end that gives form and meaning to the rest of the terms, which strictly speaking, are likenesses to it. Speaking theologically, the prime analogate of human history is God himself, and more precisely his own action and self-revelation in time. So the distinct task of Catholic history would seem to be to search for the likeness of all temporal things in their historicity to the saving acts of God, especially in the person of the incarnate Son, and thus to point out the most important and spiritual aspect of His providence. This is certainly a grand task, and one that seems impossible for the Catholic historian to ignore. And yet it seems some very real difficulties will arise when one tries to apply it. One is quite practical. It is hard to write typologically for a contemporary audience, who, even if Catholic, are often not used to thinking

typologically about history. We historians, furthermore, are scarcely trained formally to do so either. Hence Shannon's basic prescription that we start with a new way of reading seems to me quite sound. That this new way of reading should include a revival of a typological sensibility seems to me obvious.

Yet, I think that it is necessary that we be very clear about just what the end of historical inquiry is, and what makes it different from that of a theologian or philosopher of history. Although not without some pre-Christian roots, the four senses of Scripture were developed mostly to understand the spiritual significance of the Word of God, especially in relating the Old Testament to the revealed fact of the Incarnation of the Son of God. This is to say its purpose was theological. Now, one may postulate simply enough that all history, even "secular" history, stands in analogy to this saving mystery, from which it draws its most fundamental meaning. And this would certainly be true. But who is going to be best able to understand this *theological* meaning of history—a historically attuned theologian or a historian with theological interests? I suspect, in most cases, the former. For surely it requires, above all, a subtlety of specifically theological understanding to bring out a theological meaning? A similar argument could be made with regard to the application of philosophical principles, such as natural law, to history, although perhaps the historian's disadvantage here is less marked, in that like the philosopher the historian's primary intellectual skills are based upon natural reason.

So what can the historian contribute better than any others to a revived Catholic understanding of history? The answer, it seems to me, is the depth and breadth of his engagement with the particular actualities of the past. But it is important to be precise here to avoid falling back into the fact/value dichotomy. What I have in mind is the historian's ability to relate a larger and more completely investigated set of historical particulars *qua* particular (actions, influences, interrelations, contingent cultural contexts, etc.) to general truths about man taught by theology and philosophy. So far as I can see, even if we substitute "man in history" for "man" in the last sentence, the point still holds.

Thus, the historian does not need to equal the theologian or philosopher in the extensiveness, or technical depth of his interpretation of history in terms of general truths; but he naturally will have a great advantage in understanding the subtleties of the particularities that stand in relation to them. It is his right and duty to study these same relations, *i.e.* of the particular to general truth, but unlike the theologian or philosopher of history, he will generally do so from the standpoint of the particulars. This is his most proper occupation, and the one in which no other specialist can match his expertise.

In practice, this can be done in any number of ways, and here I agree with Christopher Shannon that to do so we need not merely copy traditional patterns of Catholic historiography, however useful these will continue to be. But with regard to specifics of relating the particulars of human existence in time to general truths in a historical way, I will content myself with a single example: It is possible for Catholic historians to concentrate on saints and saint-like figures of the times, places and events which they are presenting, so as to show how these concrete types of Christ—the eternal exemplar of all truth—were instantiated in their particular context. For instance, a history of diplomacy or strategic military leadership during the First World War could give special prominence to the Blessed Charles Hapsburg. This would by no means require a triumphalistic exaggeration of his actual role or influence on events, nor would it even require lots of explicit remarking upon his virtues or analyses of his actions drawing specific attention to the eternal standards they might instantiate. It would require, however, setting the right tone and frame of analysis for the reader at the outset, and/or otherwise accentuating their relation to the truth about the good, so that the reader can draw the requisite conclusions himself.

This brings me to my final comment. Christopher Shannon suggests that a revival of Catholic historiography should avoid a multiplication of scholarship by limiting the amount produced on the model of an old professional guild. If he merely means by this that we should avoid the sometimes pointless multiplication of scholarship produced by the modern research university, I am in full agreement. In the short run, to be sure, we must make a virtue of necessity, since the number of historians fully committed to the Catholic vision is evidently relatively small at present. But in the longer run, if there should be the major revival of Catholic historiography he and I hope for, it seems to me hard to say for now whether few histories or many devoted to some given approach or topic will prove useful or necessary. The very nature of historiography, after all, tends to expansiveness in as far as it is intended to make visible to us a vast ocean of the past, all of it, as we know, shaped by God's mysterious providence, whether or not any of us can fully grasp the mercies of its immense working.

A Response from Adam L. Tate
Clayton State University

Christopher Shannon's essay does for the Catholic historian what Keith Windshuttle's 1996 polemic *The Killing of History* attempted for historians in general; that is, call historians back from the precipice of postmodernism. As Shannon and Windshuttle note, the professional discipline of history has undergone a profound intellectual crisis in the twentieth century and has lost much of its coherence. Whereas Windshuttle presented a utilitarian defense of the historical method that called historians back to Enlightenment rationalism, Shannon's essay offers important reflections and prescriptions for Catholic historians to reconnect them to the Catholic intellectual tradition.¹

The historian's task is a difficult one. He aims first to reconstruct the past using sound methods and an incomplete and limited source record and then to explicate the broader meaning of the past. The practice of history requires a philosophical backdrop and a particular view of human nature, but many, if not most, professional historians rarely articulate the philosophy that informs their works. Because of their assumptions, historians have been easy targets for postmodernist critics who undermine the epistemological realism most historians instinctively practice. The result has been the "killing of history," in Windshuttle's phrase. Once intelligible, the past now has become a place of oppressive power relationships and shifting human identities based on endless arrangements—"constructions"—of postmodernism's unholy trinity: race, class, and gender. Employing the tools of skepticism and relativism and positing that humans have no set nature, postmodernists have claimed that history is no more than a fable and reality is unknowable. These are, however, philosophical assumptions, not "historical truths." The past itself has not changed, only the philosophical assumptions of historians.² The crisis in modern history, as Shannon implies, is a philosophical one.

Postmodernists have attacked historical methodology as well. The strongest point they have made is that culture influences the point of view of both the historical sources and the historian himself in a myriad of complex ways. Historical knowledge, therefore, is hopelessly incomplete and tainted by inaccuracies. St. Augustine framed a similar point in a different way. Because human beings are not omniscient, the past will remain fully known to God alone. Human beings can understand only glimpses of the past and can comprehend only part of the experiences of individuals. The wellspring of human motivation, what transpires between the individual soul and God, cannot be captured and studied by the historian.

The difference between a postmodernist and an Augustinian is that the Augustinian believes in a fixed human nature. Whereas historical persons might have attempted to deceive in the writings they left behind, the historian, through empathy, can make plausible attempts to account for human weaknesses and uncover past human motivations. Having discarded the assumption of a common human nature, the postmodernist is left looking for human agency in the only area now shared by humans, the actions of individuals.

Shannon destroys the postmodernist approach when discussing Kathy Peiss' book, which asserts that there was a culture of sexual experimentation in turn-of-the-century New York on the basis of an incident in which a young lady succumbed to a man's attempt to grope her on the street. "Inferring agency from action" is problematic, Shannon tells us, because interpreting the facts presupposes philosophical assumptions that may not be accurate. Many historians would agree that Peiss' method is flawed and limits the sources to say what she wants them to say. A logical historical methodology that recognizes the complexity of discerning human motivation can correct Peiss' error. But Shannon is right to point out that interpretation presupposes an intellectual tradition or philosophy.

Shannon furthers his critique through examining interpretative frameworks historians use. Historians judge the meanings of past actions and in this task employ philosophical assumptions that lie outside of the historical narrative. Faith in the idea of progress, the mainstay of what Herbert Butterfield termed the "whig interpretation of history," is the most conspicuous example of this in American historiography.³ Shannon puts it well: "The evidence that professional historians have mustered to justify the march of progress has just as often been served as ammunition in the battle against modernity: one man's oppression is another man's community, one man's superstition is another man's spirituality. Judgments about these facts are indeed arbitrary apart from any authoritative interpretive tradition." The problem of interpretation is linked to the postmodernists' stress on the cultural influences on human action and ideas. The historian, like all people, is limited by his own experience, knowledge of the world, imagination, and culture. Shannon indicates that the Catholic historian might employ a unique framework. Here he examines the work of John McGreevy.

John McGreevy's *Catholicism and American Freedom* synthesized scholarship on American Catholic history to reveal the interplay between Catholicism and American notions of individual autonomy from the 1830s to the present.⁴ Shannon criticizes McGreevy for not using a Catholic sensibility and moral ethic to address more directly in his scholarship the evil of abortion in American society.

Shannon is too harsh on McGreevy. McGreevy's book illustrates well Shannon's point about interpretative framework. The very question of the compatibility of Catholicism and American freedom, narrowly defined as autonomous individualism, is an old question that both Catholics and their evangelical Protestant opponents asked during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. American secularists, as McGreevy detailed in his book, also engaged the issue periodically. Interestingly, very few secular scholars have investigated deeply the compatibility question. They probably display as little interest and see as little significance to the question as I would to the issue of the compatibility of Mormonism and American freedom. McGreevy's Catholicism displays itself in both the subject he chose to study and the specific questions he asked of the past.

The critique of McGreevy produces a dilemma. Shannon rightly demonstrates that the historian's task is intimately wrapped up in philosophical assumptions. Philosophy, however, especially when it depends on observed past human experience to make claims, also relies upon history. But philosophy and history are distinguishable from one another. Philosophy is the love of wisdom and the search for truth about reality. History attempts to recreate the past to understand both what happened and the effects of past human actions on the world. Both philosophy and history lean on one another but are not identical or interchangeable. Shannon seems to identify philosophy and history too closely. He wants the Catholic historian to look at the past through specific moral and theological lenses and thus severely limit the history produced. But in reviving Augustinian providential history, Shannon fails to answer the argument against this approach leveled in Early Modern Europe. As Mark Gilderhus puts it, "As historians realized, it was one thing to say with conviction that God acted in history and quite another to determine with any precision just where and when."⁵ The discipline of history became more secular when historians realized that historical methods were unable to reveal the mind of God. In other words, historians realized that history, philosophy, and theology were not identical.

Where does this leave the Catholic historian? Catholics often will have a different set of questions about the past than will secularists because their intellectual world and culture shape them in different ways. For this reason, they will produce different histories, proving the old dictum, "Ask a different question, get a different answer." A revival of Catholic history depends upon the revival of Catholic culture in general. Future Catholic historians must be trained in the intellectual traditions of the Faith if they are to ask specifically Catholic questions about the past.

Without a vibrant Catholic culture to inform their worldview, future Catholic historians would differ little from their secular counterparts. It is no wonder then, in this age of extreme crisis within the Church, that Shannon finds Catholic history lacking.

Several of Shannon's practical suggestions are problematic. In his discussion of the "monographic tradition," Shannon indicates that Catholic scholars should read monographs for "what they really are: less accounts of fact than reflections on value." This puzzles me, for every graduate history student, regardless of ideological or religious leanings, learns this process when studying historiography. Most graduate programs assign monographs not to convey factual information, but to explain different schools of historical interpretation. The process Shannon encourages is already in place. I would also question Shannon's advice to limit production of historical works. If the state of Catholic history is as bad as Shannon claims it is (and I do not doubt him), then it would seem logical that Catholics would desire an explosion of scholarship asking specifically Catholic questions about the past. In this way, Catholic historians would create a large historical literature that fleshes out misunderstood, underrepresented, or ignored parts of the past. This, in turn, would enrich the historical profession in general.

Shannon needs to explicate further his contention that Catholic history "requires moral judgment in the selection of topics and in the focus of study within each topic." Both the selection of a historical topic of inquiry and the methodology used depend on the questions asked of the past. I am not certain of the moral component of this task. To explain something is not to excuse it. A historian studying American slavery or the Holocaust is not excusing the existence of those great evils. In an age of globalization in which Christianity has spread throughout the world, Catholic historians, even if they confined themselves to studying past Catholics, would have a wide variety of cultures and topics to explore. Also, as the great Catholic historian Christopher Dawson argued in *The Crisis of Western Education*, "Christian education should be wider, not narrower, than that of the secular school."⁶ Catholicism, far from limiting inquiry to a few questions, broadens it. Catholic history is inclusive in the best sense. It studies all that has been redeemed by Christ; that is, humanity itself. Shannon affirms this point, but then charges that "the truths at stake are too important to subject to the cycles of revision."

The Catholic historian is left wondering just what he is supposed to study. Shannon advises that Catholic historians should read "the best of the monographic literature of the last hundred years" for its "ethical, philosophical content." "Texts," he tells us, "would be studied

and taught not as more or less accurate accounts of particular historical periods, but as more or less true arguments illuminating aspects of Christian social philosophy.” So in the end, Shannon has the Catholic historian becoming a Catholic philosopher.

Just as Windshuttle’s *The Killing of History* launched a much needed debate on the place of history within the Academy, Christopher Shannon’s critique can prompt a productive discussion on the discipline of history within the Catholic intellectual tradition.⁷ Shannon could improve his argument in two ways. First, he should provide a definition of history and explain how it differs from philosophy and theology. Second, he should expound on the practical suggestions he has for Catholic historians. With good discussion and vigorous debate, faithful Catholic historians could place themselves, as he suggests, on the cutting edge of intellectual life within the Church. History, after all, has much to tell us.

Notes

1. Keith Windshuttle, *The Killing of History: How Literary Critics and Social Theorists are Murdering Our Past* (New York: The Free Press, 1997).
2. The story of postmodernism's attack on history has been well documented. Windshuttle, in chapter one of *The Killing of History*, details the different postmodernist schools of thought. See also, Mark T. Gilderhus, *History and Historians: A Historiographical Introduction*, 6th edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc., 2007). Martha Howell & Walter Prevenier, *From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 69-118. Anthony Molho and Gordon S. Wood, "Introduction" to *Imagined Histories: American Historians Interpret the Past* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 3-20.
3. Herbert Butterfield, *The Whig Interpretation of History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1965).
4. John McGreevy, *Catholicism and American Freedom: A History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2003). Also, see Shannon's exchange with McGreevy in *Historically Speaking*, Vol. VI, no. 1 (September-October 2004): 32-35.
5. Gilderhus, *History and Historians*, 30.
6. Christopher Dawson, *The Crisis of Western Education* (Steubenville, OH: Franciscan University Press, 1989), 187.
7. I have found two Catholic explorations of history very compelling: Jacques Maritain, *On the Philosophy of History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), and M.C. D'Arcy, S.J., *The Meaning and Matter of History: A Christian View* (New York: Meridian Books, 1961).